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Undermining	  the	  West	  from	  within:	  European	  populists,	  the	  US	  and	  Russia1	  
Angelos-­‐Stylianos	  Chryssogelos	  
	  
Abstract	  	  Populist	  parties	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  Left	  are	  on	  the	  rise	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  but	  little	  has	  been	  said	  
about	  their	  foreign	  policy	  positions.	  This	  article	  will	  try	  to	  sketch	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  the	  positions	  of	  
some	  important	  radical	  Right	  and	  Left	  populist	  parties	  on	  transatlantic	  relations,	  NATO,	  European	  
security	  and	  EU–Russia	  relations.	  An	  examination	  of	  these	  positions	  reveals	  that	  European	  populist	  
parties	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  Left	  are	  united	  by	  a	  common	  aversion	  to	  the	  ongoing	  modernisation	  and	  
liberalisation	  of	  society	  and	  the	  economy—and	  that	  this	  aversion	  is	  reflected	  in	  foreign	  policies	  that	  
conceptually	  and	  practically	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  West.	  The	  centre-­‐right	  is	  urged	  not	  to	  let	  
populists	  appropriate	  yet	  another	  issue.	  Instead,	  it	  needs	  to	  challenge	  them	  (and	  particularly	  the	  
populist	  Left)	  by	  consistently	  defending	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  Western	  community	  of	  values.	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This	  article	  deals	  with	  the	  positions	  of	  European	  populist	  parties	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  Left	  on	  the	  topics	  of	  
transatlantic	  cooperation,	  NATO,	  European	  security	  and	  Europe–Russia	  relations.	  It	  will	  thus	  undertake	  
two	  tasks	  that	  are	  usually	  left	  unattended	  in	  current	  comparative	  political	  research.	  First,	  	  both	  right-­‐
wing	  and	  left-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  will	  be	  studied.	  Populism	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	  radical	  Right	  
parties;	  in	  turn,	  the	  Right	  is	  usually	  associated	  with	  challenges	  to	  liberal	  democracy.	  Here	  I	  will	  show	  that	  
populism	  is	  a	  common	  trait	  of	  both	  the	  far	  Right	  and	  the	  far	  Left,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  used	  to	  update	  
authoritarian	  ideologies	  that	  have	  been	  overtaken	  by	  the	  ongoing	  liberalisation	  of	  politics,	  society	  and	  
economics	  in	  Europe.	  The	  similarities	  between	  the	  populist	  Right	  and	  the	  populist	  Left	  will	  be	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  field	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  This	  is	  the	  second	  analytical	  contribution	  of	  the	  article.	  
Foreign	  policy	  rarely	  features	  in	  analyses	  of	  populist	  parties	  and	  their	  policies.	  Yet	  foreign	  policy	  is	  a	  field	  
that	  offers	  itself	  for	  emotional	  and	  high-­‐profile	  interventions.	  Populist	  parties,	  so	  keen	  on	  using	  the	  
media	  and	  making	  headlines	  with	  simplistic	  but	  impressive	  policy	  proposals,	  cannot	  afford	  to	  ignore	  
foreign	  policy.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  article,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  basic	  theoretical	  introduction	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
populism	  and	  explain	  the	  rationale	  for	  combining	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  populist	  Left	  and	  the	  populist	  Right.	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  populist	  parties	  in	  Europe	  are	  united	  not	  only	  by	  a	  common	  style,	  that	  of	  populism,	  but	  
also	  by	  the	  will	  to	  use	  populism	  to	  update	  authoritarian	  and	  anti-­‐pluralist	  projects	  of	  the	  past.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  the	  reason	  for	  looking	  at	  both	  Right	  and	  Left	  populism	  is	  the	  common	  challenge	  they	  pose	  to	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modern	  liberal	  democracy:	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  vision	  of	  an	  undifferentiated,	  majoritarian	  and	  illiberal	  
society.	  	  
In	  the	  subsequent	  two	  sections	  I	  will	  show	  how	  this	  vision	  finds	  expression	  in	  the	  foreign	  policies	  
of	  the	  parties	  towards	  the	  US	  and	  Russia.	  The	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  these	  foreign	  policy	  positions	  aim	  to	  
undermine	  the	  dominant	  ideas	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  governance	  of	  modern	  Western	  democracy.	  
Populist	  foreign	  policy	  positions	  are	  thus	  highly	  relevant.	  They	  allow	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  
populism	  as	  an	  opponent	  to	  the	  process	  of	  social	  modernisation	  and	  diversification.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
they	  show	  how	  foreign	  policy	  becomes	  a	  field	  where	  contending	  visions	  of	  domestic	  governance	  find	  
expression	  and	  reflect	  back	  onto	  domestic	  discourse.	  Here,	  populist	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  pro-­‐
Russianism	  reflect	  the	  populist	  parties’	  efforts	  to	  update	  their	  ideological	  traditions	  of	  authoritarian	  
politics	  and	  unitary	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  with	  reference	  to	  modern	  problems	  of	  European	  
security.	  The	  populists’	  preference	  for	  a	  Europe	  independent	  of	  American	  influence	  and	  
accomodationist	  to	  Russian	  demands	  corresponds	  to	  this	  specific	  model	  of	  domestic	  politics.	  Whether	  
coming	  from	  the	  Left	  or	  the	  Right,	  European	  populism	  expresses	  a	  profound	  unease	  with	  ongoing	  
modernisation,	  and	  this	  unease	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  way	  it	  tries	  to	  undermine	  the	  ideological	  coherence	  of	  
Western	  modernity.	  In	  the	  final	  section	  of	  the	  article	  I	  will	  formulate	  some	  policy	  proposals	  about	  how	  
best	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  populist	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
	  
European	  populism:	  no	  longer	  yesterday’s	  news	  
	  
European	  populism	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  thin-­‐centred	  ideology.2	  It	  provides	  a	  few	  ideological	  
guidelines,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  complete	  system	  of	  thought.	  Populism	  offers	  some	  beliefs,	  but	  these	  beliefs	  
can	  be	  adapted	  to	  many	  political	  messages	  and	  serve	  different	  political	  goals.	  Populism	  then	  is	  
something	  more	  than	  a	  political	  style:	  it	  is	  not	  just	  a	  manner	  of	  saying	  (or	  promising)	  things,	  it	  is	  a	  sum	  of	  
understandings.	  But	  it	  also	  something	  less	  than	  a	  political	  ideology:	  populism	  is	  an	  empty	  shell,	  a	  frame	  
for	  political	  ideas,	  filled	  with	  specific	  ideological	  understandings	  according	  to	  the	  political	  agent’s	  
preferences.	  
Populism	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  following	  main	  ideological	  prescriptions:	  
a)	  A	  Manichaean	  struggle	  between	  two	  coherent	  entities:	  the	  ‘elites’	  and	  the	  ‘people’.	  Populist	  
parties	  defend	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  people	  from	  corrupt,	  insensitive,	  alienated	  elites.	  
b)	  The	  heartland:	  populist	  parties	  define	  the	  people	  in	  unitary,	  exclusionary	  terms.	  Their	  ‘us’	  is	  
categorically	  different	  from	  any	  ‘them’.	  This	  is	  evoked	  in	  the	  image	  of	  a	  heartland,	  an	  emotionally	  
defined	  image	  of	  a	  visionary	  time	  and/or	  place	  where	  the	  populist’s	  people	  lived	  as	  sovereign	  and	  
isolated	  from	  foreign	  influences.	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c)	  The	  politics	  of	  the	  Stammtisch	  (the	  pub):	  populist	  parties	  offer	  easy	  and	  compact	  solutions	  to	  
complicated	  problems.	  Usually	  this	  is	  done	  through	  targeting	  guilty	  elites	  or	  social	  groups	  as	  responsible	  
for	  pressing	  problems.	  
d)	  Political	  entrepreneurship:	  the	  positions	  and	  strategies	  of	  populist	  parties	  are	  best	  understood	  
as	  the	  movements	  of	  non-­‐principled,	  opportunist	  politicians	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  effectively	  controlling	  
whole	  parties	  or	  movements.	  Intra-­‐party	  politics	  and	  other	  such	  analyses	  yield	  little	  in	  trying	  to	  
understand	  the	  positions	  of	  skilful	  tacticians.	  	  
What	  is	  problematic	  here	  is	  that	  these	  prescriptions	  are	  not	  enough	  for	  comparative	  purposes.	  
Populism	  has	  become	  a	  fixture	  of	  mainstream	  democratic	  politics,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  power	  of	  electronic	  
media	  and	  their	  focus	  on	  individuals	  and	  personalities.	  If	  I	  am	  to	  justify	  the	  common	  inclusion	  of	  populist	  
Right	  and	  populist	  Left	  parties	  in	  this	  article,	  something	  more	  than	  their	  populist	  rhetoric	  will	  need	  to	  do	  
the	  job.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  have	  to	  show	  not	  only	  that	  they	  share	  the	  same	  shell,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  fill	  it	  
with	  similar	  things.	  	  
What	  radical	  right-­‐wing	  and	  new	  left-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  effort	  to	  
update	  authoritarian,	  illiberal	  and	  anti-­‐pluralist	  ideologies	  of	  the	  past	  that	  have	  been	  overcome	  by	  the	  
ongoing	  process	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  modernisation	  and	  diversification.	  The	  populisms	  of	  the	  Right	  
and	  Left	  represent	  efforts	  to	  update	  failed	  projects	  for	  the	  management	  of	  the	  modern	  economy	  and	  
society.	  They	  are	  responses	  to	  events	  of	  profound	  crisis	  for	  the	  respective	  ideologies	  they	  try	  to	  keep	  
alive.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  radical	  Right	  from	  the	  late	  1960s	  onwards	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  
update	  the	  failed	  premodern	  and	  modern	  ideals	  that	  seemed	  irrevocably	  buried	  under	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  
Second	  World	  War:	  nationalism,	  religious	  traditionalism,	  racism	  and	  corporatism.	  By	  using	  the	  populist	  
inventory	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  political	  entrepreneurs	  of	  the	  radical	  Right	  keep	  alive	  these	  values	  
within	  the	  new	  political	  environment.	  The	  targeting	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  ’68	  and,	  later,	  of	  immigration	  and	  
globalisation	  allows	  them	  to	  take	  positions	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  the	  day,	  and	  indirectly	  to	  keep	  challenging	  
liberal	  and	  postmodern	  politics.	  Similarly,	  the	  recent	  rise	  of	  the	  populist	  Left	  has	  been	  a	  response	  to	  
almost	  20	  years	  of	  disarray	  in	  the	  Communist	  Left	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  Communism.	  New	  populist	  Left	  
parties	  target	  neoliberal	  elites	  and	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  an	  undifferentiated	  and	  sovereign	  people	  in	  order	  
to	  update	  their	  image.	  Just	  like	  radical	  Right	  parties,	  successful	  populist	  Left	  parties	  do	  not	  fight	  the	  
battles	  of	  the	  past.	  Instead,	  they	  use	  their	  keen	  political	  instinct	  to	  embrace	  new	  issues	  like	  the	  
environment,	  global	  justice	  and	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  and	  financial	  architecture.	  
	  
United	  in	  anti-­‐Americanism:	  European	  populism	  and	  transatlantic	  relations	  
	  
European	  populist	  parties	  are	  united	  by	  a	  disdain	  for	  elites	  and	  their	  perceived	  effort	  to	  dilute	  the	  
sovereign	  ability	  of	  the	  people	  to	  take	  care	  of	  their	  own	  business.	  In	  the	  international	  arena,	  populism	  
sees	  the	  US	  as	  a	  natural	  target.	  For	  the	  radical	  Right	  the	  US	  is	  perceived	  as	  an	  omnipresent	  superpower	  
that	  threatens	  national	  sovereignty.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  radical	  Right	  was	  especially	  pronounced	  in	  the	  late	  
1980s	  and	  throughout	  the	  1990s,	  and	  it	  reflected	  an	  unease	  not	  only	  with	  modernisation	  and	  economic	  
globalisation,	  but	  also	  the	  perception	  that	  the	  nation	  state	  was	  losing	  much	  of	  its	  power	  of	  control	  and	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regulation.	  In	  this	  context,	  radical	  Right	  parties	  maintain	  an	  essentially	  premodern	  collectivist,	  ethnic	  
understanding	  of	  the	  national	  community	  by	  sticking	  to	  the	  classical	  understanding	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  
as	  the	  building	  block	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  US	  influence	  is	  associated	  both	  with	  power	  politics	  that	  
threaten	  to	  weaken	  specific	  nation	  states,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  globalising	  culture	  that	  
dilutes	  this	  communitarianism.	  In	  either	  case,	  anti-­‐US	  feelings	  are	  used	  to	  placate	  the	  radical	  Right’s	  
preferred	  understanding	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  as	  an	  ethnically	  defined,	  homogeneous	  community.	  
For	  the	  populist	  Left,	  anti-­‐US	  populism	  allows	  it	  to	  aim	  its	  critique	  at	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  global	  
economic	  system	  and	  the	  pace	  of	  globalisation	  that	  is	  apparently	  leading	  to	  radical	  deregulation	  and	  the	  
weakening	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  financial	  and	  transnational	  economic	  actors.	  Left-­‐wing	  populists	  
defend	  the	  nation	  state	  because	  inside	  it	  social	  and	  welfare	  legislation	  is	  better	  implemented.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  they	  also	  see	  the	  US	  as	  a	  force	  that	  undermines	  the	  nationally	  defined	  community,	  but,	  unlike	  the	  
radical	  Right,	  they	  see	  this	  community	  not	  in	  ethnic	  but	  economic	  terms.	  US-­‐led	  globalisation	  is	  seen	  as	  
promoting	  the	  subjugation	  of	  the	  working	  people	  (understood	  in	  broader	  class	  terms).	  Thus	  the	  populist	  
Left’s	  anti-­‐Americanism	  is	  an	  updated	  version	  of	  the	  traditional	  Communist	  opposition	  to	  the	  US,	  since	  it	  
allows	  the	  populist	  Left	  to	  position	  itself	  on	  important	  current	  topics.	  Just	  like	  the	  radical	  Right,	  the	  new	  
populist	  Left	  is	  nation-­‐centric	  and	  manages	  to	  bring	  back	  into	  the	  political	  struggle	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  
a	  failed	  political	  project,	  namely	  Communism	  and	  radical	  socialism.	  A	  crucial	  difference,	  however,	  is	  that	  
this	  leftist	  populism	  is	  complemented	  by	  a	  powerful	  internationalist	  element,	  reflecting	  its	  ideological	  
descent	  from	  transnational	  socialism.	  Whereas	  the	  populist	  Left’s	  anti-­‐Americanism	  corresponds	  to	  a	  
welfare	  nationalism	  at	  home,	  it	  also	  is	  expressed	  in	  a	  radical	  espousal	  of	  various	  anti-­‐globalisation	  
causes	  (for	  example,	  global	  justice	  or	  the	  environment)	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  an	  anti-­‐imperialist	  rhetoric	  
(as	  seen	  in	  their	  proposals	  for	  a	  reform	  of	  global	  institutions).	  Nevertheless,	  even	  this	  internationalism	  
does	  not	  escape	  the	  pattern	  we	  have	  identified	  here.	  Global	  justice	  and	  North-­‐vs-­‐South	  rhetoric	  is	  a	  
fresher	  version	  of	  the	  Communist	  Left’s	  traditional	  espousal	  of	  Third	  World	  nationalism.	  
This	  is	  the	  general	  pattern	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  among	  populist	  parties.	  But	  this	  anti-­‐Americanism	  
has	  tangible	  consequences	  for	  European	  politics.	  Anti-­‐American	  populism	  updates	  certain	  national	  
ideological	  traditions	  that	  have	  always	  nurtured	  a	  specific	  vision	  of	  European	  institutions,	  security	  and	  
relations	  with	  the	  US.	  In	  this	  way,	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policies	  become	  connected	  in	  a	  coherent	  radical	  
vision	  that	  rejects	  the	  modernisation	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  society	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  
nation	  state.	  Yet	  this	  populism	  is	  decisively	  shaped	  by	  the	  national	  context	  and	  the	  ideological	  baggage	  
of	  each	  party.	  Two	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  radical	  Right	  parties	  of	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  the	  French	  Front	  
National	  (FN)	  and	  the	  Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (FPÖ),	  are	  also	  two	  of	  the	  standard-­‐bearers	  of	  this	  
conservative	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  Just	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  their	  domestic	  policies,	  their	  populism,	  
expressed	  in	  an	  unequivocal	  anti-­‐Americanism,	  allowed	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  their	  ideological	  traditions	  
and	  their	  prescriptions	  for	  the	  future	  of	  European	  security.	  	  
The	  FN	  represents	  the	  defeated	  Right	  of	  200	  years	  of	  political	  struggle	  in	  France.	  It	  is	  the	  heir	  to	  
monarchist,	  fanatical	  Catholic,	  ultra-­‐nationalist	  and	  Vichyist	  political	  traditions.	  These	  ideological	  
currents	  have	  always	  maintained	  a	  hostility	  towards	  the	  US,	  expressed	  in	  prescriptions	  of	  an	  
independent	  French	  foreign	  policy	  geared	  towards	  grandeur	  and	  a	  pessimistic	  cultural	  critique.	  Today	  
the	  FN	  maintains	  this	  nationalistic	  discourse	  by	  promoting	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  emancipated	  and	  strategically	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independent	  Europe	  that	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  multipolar	  world.	  It	  calls	  for	  France’s	  exit	  
from	  NATO	  and	  distrusts	  the	  latter’s	  meddling	  in	  European	  politics.	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  is	  akin	  to	  a	  
primitive	  Gaullism,	  a	  fossilised	  nationalist	  foreign	  policy	  that	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  institutional	  
realities	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  NATO.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  FN	  castigates	  globalisation	  as	  an	  American	  economic	  
and	  cultural	  project	  that	  threatens	  sovereignty	  and	  national	  uniformity	  (Front	  National	  2009).	  	  
Sometimes	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  ideological	  baggage	  but	  also	  the	  political	  instinct	  of	  entrepreneurial	  
tacticians	  which	  determines	  the	  content	  of	  radical	  populism.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FPÖ,	  it	  was	  Jörg	  Haider’s	  
exit	  from	  the	  party	  which	  allowed	  it	  to	  embrace	  anti-­‐Americanism	  wholeheartedly.	  Jörg	  Haider’s	  rise	  to	  
prominence	  in	  Austrian	  politics	  was	  also	  characterised	  by	  his	  promotion	  of	  closer	  ties	  between	  a	  neutral	  
Austria	  and	  NATO.	  Unlike	  the	  FN,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  FPÖ	  pro-­‐NATO	  rhetoric	  was	  a	  strong	  signal	  by	  Haider	  
that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  reform	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  failed	  Proporz	  system	  of	  the	  two	  main	  parties.	  After	  the	  
FPÖ’s	  entry	  into	  government	  in	  2000,	  discussion	  about	  Austria’s	  possible	  entry	  into	  NATO	  intensified.	  
But	  Haider	  made	  an	  abrupt	  about-­‐face	  when	  he	  decided	  to	  support	  Saddam	  Hussein	  during	  the	  Iraq	  
crisis	  and	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  US	  security	  policies.	  Haider	  saw	  international	  politics	  as	  a	  way	  to	  escape	  his	  
domestic	  isolation	  in	  the	  post	  of	  governor	  of	  Carinthia.	  This	  change	  in	  turn	  contributed	  to	  his	  breaking	  
with	  the	  mainstream	  of	  his	  party,	  which	  felt	  uncomfortable	  flirting	  with	  Arab	  dictators.	  His	  exit	  allowed	  
the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  principled	  ideology,	  which	  nevertheless	  builds	  on	  Haider’s	  turn	  towards	  the	  
pro-­‐German	  nationalist	  wing	  of	  Austrian	  national	  liberalism	  (ADL	  2002;	  Perault	  2000;	  Pfefferkorn	  1997).	  
These	  ideological	  currents	  share	  an	  aversion	  both	  to	  the	  pervasive	  nature	  of	  globalisation	  and	  to	  US	  
influence	  on	  sovereign	  nations.	  The	  FPÖ	  is	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  Austrian	  neutrality	  and	  represents	  
hard-­‐line	  Euroscepticism.	  The	  Gaullist	  legacy	  is	  represented	  in	  Austria	  by	  Haider’s	  FPÖ	  offshoot,	  the	  BZÖ	  
(Alliance	  for	  the	  Future	  of	  Austria),	  which	  couples	  anti-­‐US	  feelings	  with	  a	  call	  for	  an	  intergovernmental	  
but	  strategically	  capable	  Europe	  on	  the	  global	  scene	  (see	  BZÖ	  2010,	  31,	  36).	  
The	  populist	  Left’s	  socialism	  and	  Communism	  feed	  its	  ardent	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  But	  anti-­‐
Americanism	  allows	  new	  populist	  Left	  parties,	  like	  the	  German	  Die	  Linke	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Socialist	  Party	  
(SP),	  to	  position	  themselves	  on	  pressing	  issues	  of	  international	  politics	  and	  thus	  modernise	  their	  rigid	  
and	  failed	  legacy.	  Whereas	  the	  radical	  Right	  parties	  are	  driven	  by	  their	  concern	  to	  keep	  national	  
communities	  sovereign,	  independent	  and	  undiluted,	  Die	  Linke	  and	  the	  SP	  espouse	  a	  radical	  
internationalism,	  accepting	  the	  need	  for	  cooperation	  on	  the	  European	  and	  the	  international	  level,	  but	  
completely	  rejecting	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements.	  Both	  see	  NATO	  as	  an	  aggressive	  military	  
alliance,	  the	  military	  arm	  of	  American-­‐led	  neoliberal	  globalisation.	  Die	  Linke	  call	  directly	  for	  its	  
dissolution	  and	  replacement	  by	  a	  pan-­‐European	  security	  organisation,	  whereas	  the	  SP	  is	  very	  reluctant	  
to	  accept	  any	  strategic	  redefinition	  of	  NATO’s	  role.	  Both	  parties	  opposed	  the	  continuation	  of	  their	  
countries’	  deployment	  in	  Afghanistan,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  SP	  actually	  contributing	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  
Balkenende	  government	  in	  early	  2010.	  The	  EU	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  dissociate	  itself	  from	  NATO	  and	  become	  
a	  ‘civil	  power’,	  while	  internationally	  security	  should	  be	  provided	  by	  collective	  institutions	  like	  the	  UN	  
(Schultz	  2009;	  SP	  2010b).	  	  
The	  populist	  Left’s	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  radical	  Right	  is	  its	  inherited	  
internationalism,	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  seek	  organisational	  vigour	  and	  ideological	  renewal	  through	  
affiliation	  with	  transnational	  movements	  and	  global	  causes.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  old	  anti-­‐Americanism	  of	  the	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Communist	  and	  radical	  Left	  become	  renewed	  through	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  reform	  of	  international	  
institutions	  and	  a	  condemnation	  of	  structural	  imbalances,	  poverty,	  war	  and	  exploitation.	  The	  US	  is	  
identified	  the	  most	  with	  these	  imbalances	  of	  globalisation.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  populist	  Left’s	  radical	  
internationalism	  also	  reinforces	  protectionist	  and	  nationalist	  feelings	  at	  home:	  the	  Left	  is	  
internationalist,	  but	  only	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  Since	  the	  world	  it	  wants	  is	  basically	  non-­‐existent,	  it	  falls	  back	  
on	  an	  essentialist	  defence	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  as	  the	  building	  block	  which	  allows	  the	  ‘people’	  to	  remain	  
sovereign	  and	  independent	  from	  transnational	  elites	  (Die	  Linke	  2009).	  	  
Summing	  up	  this	  section,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  European	  populism	  reflects	  not	  only	  an	  unease	  with	  the	  
ongoing	  modernisation	  of	  European	  societies	  but	  also	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  main	  international	  institutions	  
that	  are	  thought	  to	  reinforce	  this	  modernisation.	  In	  the	  populist	  Right’s	  anti-­‐Americanism	  we	  see	  the	  
effort	  of	  nationalist	  and	  reactionary	  forces	  to	  revitalise	  their	  dream	  of	  ethnically	  unitary	  societies	  and	  
independent	  foreign	  policies.	  In	  the	  populist	  Left’s	  radical	  internationalism	  we	  see	  the	  effort	  of	  
delegitimised	  Communists	  and	  Socialists	  to	  revitalise	  their	  dream	  of	  regulated	  and	  insulated	  economies	  
in	  the	  West	  and	  a	  radical	  overhaul	  of	  the	  economic	  system	  globally.	  Yet	  the	  radical	  Right’s	  and	  radical	  
Left’s	  espousal	  of	  populism,	  in	  updating	  and	  embedding	  their	  outdated	  domestic	  visions,	  also	  has	  real-­‐
life	  consequences.	  In	  mounting	  a	  challenge	  to	  liberal	  and	  pluralist	  politics,	  they	  also	  infuse	  into	  public	  
discourse	  an	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  collective	  values	  and	  ideas	  of	  governance	  that	  unite	  the	  West,	  as	  
reflected	  in	  the	  transatlantic	  community	  and	  institutions	  of	  global	  governance.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  the	  
West	  is	  advancing	  towards	  postmodern	  social	  structures,	  populists	  raise	  dissent	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
West	  itself.	  This	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  way	  they	  treat	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘rest’	  as	  well.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  
Russia.	  
	  
In	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  bear:	  European	  populism,	  Europe	  and	  Russia	  
	  
Populists	  produce	  and	  disseminate	  images	  of	  Russia	  in	  congruence	  with	  their	  ideological	  baggage.	  But	  
just	  as	  with	  the	  US,	  their	  policies	  on	  Russia	  serve	  to	  embed	  a	  specific	  vision	  of	  domestic	  politics	  in	  a	  
modern	  discourse	  that	  deals	  with	  pressing	  international	  issues.	  With	  Russia	  we	  see	  again	  the	  same	  
pattern:	  populist	  parties	  engaging	  pressing	  issues	  of	  foreign	  policy	  by	  formulating	  concrete	  proposals,	  
but	  with	  an	  eye	  at	  updating	  their	  ideological	  traditions	  and	  creating	  a	  link	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  
policies.	  Populism	  allows	  radical	  Right	  and	  radical	  Left	  positions	  on	  Russia	  to	  gain	  new	  credence.	  Again,	  
the	  consequences	  for	  European	  security	  and	  integration	  are	  not	  negligible.	  
Populist	  parties	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  Left	  seem	  united	  by	  a	  common	  positive	  approach	  towards	  
Russia.	  They	  see	  Russia	  as	  an	  important	  ally	  of	  Europe	  and	  a	  partner	  that	  will	  allow	  Europe	  to	  balance	  
the	  US	  in	  international	  affairs.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘West’	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  multipolar	  
world.	  Most	  importantly,	  populist	  parties	  promote	  a	  discourse	  of	  realpolitik	  and	  material	  interests	  in	  
international	  politics,	  which	  contradicts	  the	  values	  and	  ideas	  behind	  European	  integration.	  Populist	  
parties	  see	  Russia	  as	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  and	  military	  clout	  as	  well	  as	  an	  attractive	  partner	  with	  similar	  
cultural	  traits	  as	  Europe	  has.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  populist	  parties	  completely	  discard	  issues	  of	  human	  rights	  
and	  democracy	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  Russia.	  By	  omitting	  these	  issues	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  questions	  of	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transnational	  interest,	  populists	  reinforce	  their	  vision	  of	  sovereign	  nation	  states	  furthering	  their	  
interests	  without	  reference	  to	  universal	  values	  or	  prior	  institutional	  commitments.	  In	  this	  effort	  to	  
approach	  Russia,	  populists	  use	  a	  Europeanist	  discourse,	  understanding	  relations	  with	  Russia	  through	  a	  
European	  lens.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  Euroscepticism:	  by	  seeing	  the	  world	  in	  realpolitik,	  
materialist	  terms,	  populist	  parties	  conveniently	  overlook	  the	  EU’s	  comparative	  advantage,	  which	  is	  its	  
normative	  power	  and	  ability	  to	  shape	  its	  surroundings	  through	  the	  strength	  of	  its	  values.	  Populists	  are	  
obviously	  in	  the	  business	  of	  transforming	  not	  the	  surroundings	  but	  Europe	  itself.	  	  
Radical	  Right	  parties	  that	  are	  influenced	  by	  authoritarian	  and	  nationalist	  traditions	  of	  the	  pre–
Second	  World	  War	  era	  are	  very	  comfortable	  with	  Russia,	  much	  more	  so	  than	  new	  Right	  populist	  parties	  
that	  are	  active	  in	  countries	  with	  a	  much	  thinner	  authoritarian	  tradition.	  These	  parties	  have	  a	  cultural	  
understanding	  of	  postmodern	  society	  which	  leads	  them	  to	  be	  West	  centred.	  Examples	  of	  these	  include	  
the	  populist	  Right	  parties	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Denmark.	  But	  the	  populism	  of	  such	  parties	  as	  the	  Front	  
National	  and	  the	  FPÖ	  is	  much	  more	  influenced	  by	  nation-­‐centric,	  premodern	  and	  reactionary	  political	  
ideologies.	  These	  ideologies	  inform	  these	  parties’	  unequivocal	  pro-­‐Russian	  positions.	  The	  Front	  National	  
represents	  a	  crude	  Gaullist	  vision	  of	  a	  Europe	  des	  patries,	  united	  by	  its	  common	  aversion	  to	  American	  
political	  and	  cultural	  influence.	  It	  is	  congruent	  with	  its	  nationalist	  heritage.	  The	  party	  also	  sees	  Russia	  as	  
a	  cultural	  complement	  to	  Europe.	  Europe	  should	  not	  look	  to	  Turkey	  for	  strategic	  leverage	  and	  foreign	  
policy	  dynamism,	  but	  to	  Russia	  (Le	  Pen	  2009).	  The	  FPÖ	  shows	  the	  same	  pattern.	  The	  party	  is	  a	  
continuation	  of	  German	  nationalist	  and	  national	  liberal	  traditions,	  which	  have	  always	  had	  a	  love–hate	  
relationship	  with	  Russia.	  Russia	  has	  always	  been	  seen	  as	  both	  a	  threat	  and	  an	  opportunity	  by	  German	  
nationalists.	  For	  the	  FPÖ,	  the	  Russia	  of	  today	  is	  an	  appealing	  partner	  because	  it	  counters	  US	  influence,	  
strengthens	  Europe	  in	  the	  energy	  sector,	  balances	  against	  Austrian	  nationalism’s	  traditional	  ‘others’	  who	  
are	  today	  part	  of	  NATO	  (e.g.,	  Czech	  Republic)	  and	  embeds	  a	  culture	  of	  value-­‐free	  politics	  in	  Europe	  (FPÖ	  
2009).	  The	  pro-­‐Russian	  positions	  of	  these	  two	  parties	  have	  been	  evident	  not	  only	  in	  programmatic	  
statements	  and	  declarations	  but	  also	  in	  concrete	  political	  choices:	  the	  FN	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  EU–
Russia	  modernisation	  agreement	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  while	  the	  FPÖ	  supported	  Russian	  claims	  
during	  the	  war	  with	  Georgia	  in	  2008	  (Ecker	  2008;	  Le	  Pen	  2010).	  The	  mantra	  was	  that	  the	  EU	  had	  to	  be	  
honest	  with	  Russia	  and	  not	  set	  exaggerated	  standards	  of	  good	  behaviour.	  
For	  the	  populist	  Left,	  pro-­‐Russian	  positions	  seem	  more	  natural,	  given	  the	  Left’s	  old	  affinity	  with	  
the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Of	  course	  Russia	  today	  is	  very	  different	  than	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  But	  this	  just	  goes	  to	  
show	  that	  left-­‐wing	  populists	  are	  still	  devoted	  to	  a	  vision	  of	  sovereign	  states	  and	  that	  their	  ideas	  of	  
security	  cooperation	  in	  Europe	  are	  still	  profoundly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  transatlantic	  cooperation.	  
A	  typical	  example	  here	  is	  Die	  Linke.	  Even	  though	  it	  claims	  an	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Russian	  Communist	  
Party,	  it	  still	  accepts	  the	  current	  power	  constellation	  in	  Russia	  as	  a	  fact	  of	  life	  (Gehrke	  2007).	  For	  the	  
Left,	  courting	  Russia	  complements	  its	  ideas	  on	  NATO	  and	  the	  international	  system:	  whereas	  NATO	  is	  
seen	  as	  the	  choice	  for	  war,	  Russia	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  choice	  for	  peace.	  The	  EU	  is	  urged	  to	  develop	  closer	  
contacts	  with	  as	  few	  conditionality	  criteria	  as	  possible.	  Together,	  the	  EU	  and	  Russia	  can	  counter	  the	  
belligerent	  activities	  of	  America	  in	  Europe	  and	  establish	  lasting	  peace	  in	  a	  unified	  continent.	  In	  sum,	  the	  
populist	  Left’s	  discourse	  is	  very	  reminiscent	  of	  Cold	  War–era	  Communist	  and	  radical	  socialist	  
propositions.	  Die	  Linke	  and	  the	  SP	  call	  for	  a	  pan-­‐European	  security	  framework,	  based	  on	  the	  OSCE.	  They	  
are	  willing	  to	  trade	  NATO	  security	  guarantees	  for	  a	  self-­‐managed	  pan-­‐European	  collective	  security	  
8	  
	  
system.	  Both	  parties	  have	  shown	  their	  proclivity	  towards	  pro-­‐Russian	  positions.	  They	  speak	  out	  against	  
‘provocations’	  of	  Russia,	  and	  they	  support	  Russian	  claims	  with	  respect	  to	  Georgia	  and	  energy	  disputes	  
(SP	  2010a;	  Brix	  2008).	  During	  the	  Russia–Georgia	  war	  of	  summer	  2008,	  both	  Die	  Linke	  and	  the	  SP	  
mobilised	  in	  favour	  of	  Russia	  in	  their	  national	  parliaments	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  The	  SP	  was	  
actually	  perceived	  as	  the	  most	  pro-­‐Russian	  party	  in	  the	  generally	  Atlanticist	  Netherlands	  (NRC	  
Handelsblad	  2008).	  
Die	  Linke	  in	  particular	  has	  the	  most	  developed	  positions	  on	  EU–Russia	  relations,	  and	  they	  read	  
like	  a	  throwback	  to	  Social	  Democratic	  positions	  of	  the	  1950s.	  This	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  strange,	  given	  the	  
party’s	  roots	  as	  a	  coalition	  between	  East	  German	  Communists	  and	  disgruntled	  West	  German	  Social	  
Democrats.3	  What	  is	  interesting	  here	  is	  the	  longitudinal	  pattern	  that	  arises:	  the	  pro-­‐Russian	  alliance	  of	  
the	  fringes	  today	  represents	  an	  apparently	  strange	  coalition	  of	  French	  nationalists,	  German-­‐speaking	  
national	  liberals,	  Communists	  and	  leftists.	  This	  coalition	  more	  or	  less	  corresponds	  to	  the	  same	  
ideological	  currents	  that	  drove	  Cold	  War	  détente	  in	  Germany	  and	  France	  between	  the	  1950s	  and	  1980s.	  
The	  populist	  parties	  of	  today	  see	  in	  Russia	  a	  useful	  proxy	  for	  their	  effort	  to	  promote	  a	  domestic	  vision	  of	  
majoritarian	  and	  illiberal	  social	  orders.	  Russia	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  issue	  is	  a	  very	  handy	  marker	  to	  
differentiate	  populists	  from	  the	  alliance	  of	  Russia-­‐sceptic	  mainstream	  parties,	  including	  the	  centre-­‐right,	  
Social	  Democrats,	  Liberals	  and	  Greens.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  issues	  of	  practical	  importance	  such	  as	  
energy.	  But	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  US,	  in	  their	  efforts	  they	  create	  very	  tangible	  challenges	  to	  foreign	  
policy	  orthodoxy	  in	  Europe.	  In	  essence,	  they	  update	  the	  simplistic	  vision	  of	  détente	  which	  was	  overcome	  
by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  This	  instrumentalisation	  of	  détente	  today	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  challenging	  the	  
domestic	  liberal	  order	  of	  Europe	  provides	  an	  interesting	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  pro-­‐détente	  
coalition	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  But	  as	  was	  shown	  back	  then,	  such	  instrumentalisation	  can	  be	  very	  
successful	  in	  infusing	  new	  values	  into	  public	  debate	  over	  foreign	  policy.	  In	  other	  words,	  apart	  from	  their	  
authoritarian	  and	  unitarian	  nature,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  simplistic	  and	  engaged	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  populist	  
parties	  pose	  a	  very	  practical	  challenge	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  European	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
	  
The	  mainstream	  response:	  it	  starts	  with	  foreign	  policy	  
	  
European	  populists	  use	  foreign	  policy	  to	  promote	  their	  ideological	  agendas.	  They	  shape	  foreign	  policy	  
issues	  to	  match	  their	  populist	  understandings	  about	  the	  role	  of	  elites	  and	  the	  subjugation	  of	  the	  people.	  
Radical	  Right	  populists	  promote	  anti-­‐Americanism	  because	  they	  see	  the	  US	  as	  a	  political	  and	  cultural	  
threat	  and	  an	  agent	  of	  transnational	  globalisation.	  Populist	  leftists	  criticise	  the	  US	  for	  driving	  a	  kind	  of	  
globalisation	  that	  erodes	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  to	  act	  as	  a	  welfare	  state.	  Both	  groups	  see	  
international	  politics	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  nation	  state	  and	  are	  opposed	  to	  changes	  to	  its	  nature.	  This	  
is	  reflected	  in	  the	  way	  they	  see	  Russia.	  Europe	  is	  urged	  to	  see	  Russia	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  power	  politics,	  a	  
potential	  ally	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  reshape	  the	  globalised	  world	  according	  to	  the	  populists’	  opposition	  to	  
ongoing	  modernisation,	  diversification	  and	  pluralisation.	  In	  sum,	  foreign	  policy	  becomes	  a	  very	  effective	  
marker	  issue	  of	  the	  populist	  mindset.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  reference	  to	  the	  Helsinki	  final	  act	  in	  Die	  Linke	  (2009).	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Mainstream	  parties,	  and	  especially	  the	  centre-­‐right,	  should	  deal	  with	  this	  threat	  in	  a	  substantial	  
and	  coherent	  way.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  the	  continuing	  growth	  in	  the	  power	  of	  populist	  
parties	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  Left	  is	  bound	  to	  have	  a	  tangible	  effect	  on	  foreign	  policies.	  If	  they	  had	  their	  way,	  
populist	  parties	  would	  dissolve	  NATO,	  antagonise	  the	  US,	  throw	  Europe	  into	  the	  arms	  of	  Russia	  and	  seek	  
to	  remodel	  the	  international	  economic	  system	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  values	  of	  the	  West.	  European	  
populist	  parties	  are,	  then,	  a	  clear	  ‘enemy	  within’	  in	  the	  West.	  Second,	  the	  centre-­‐right	  needs	  to	  respond	  
to	  the	  effort	  to	  instrumentalise	  foreign	  policy,	  because	  it	  keeps	  alive	  ideological	  traditions	  that	  in	  the	  
past	  have	  troubled	  Europe	  and,	  indeed,	  represent	  the	  perfect	  antithesis	  of	  the	  current	  process	  of	  
European	  integration.	  
Since	  the	  1950s	  the	  centre-­‐right	  has	  been	  the	  main	  agent	  of	  a	  process	  of	  European	  integration	  
that	  relies	  on	  the	  complementarity	  of	  European	  unification	  and	  NATO,	  on	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  
transatlantic	  community	  of	  values	  and	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  foreign	  policy	  identity	  for	  Europe	  that	  relies	  
on	  its	  soft	  and	  normative	  power.	  The	  foreign	  policy	  positions	  of	  populist	  parties	  threaten	  to	  undermine	  
the	  conceptual	  foundations	  of	  and	  the	  political	  support	  for	  this	  project.	  This	  could	  have	  profound	  
consequences	  for	  the	  electoral	  fortunes	  and	  the	  ideological	  standing	  of	  the	  centre-­‐right	  family.	  The	  
challenge	  from	  the	  Right	  feels	  more	  urgent.	  Radical	  Right	  parties,	  through	  their	  promotion	  of	  
nationalism	  and	  realpolitik,	  raise	  the	  spectre	  of	  the	  resurgence	  of	  far	  Right	  ideologies	  which	  the	  centre-­‐
right	  tried	  so	  hard	  to	  expel	  from	  mainstream	  discourse	  after	  the	  war.	  Quite	  understandably,	  to	  many	  
this	  challenge	  feels	  the	  more	  tangible.	  Yet	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  populist	  Left	  is	  building	  up	  a	  more	  profound	  
challenge.	  Unlike	  the	  radical	  Right,	  the	  populist	  Left	  is	  not	  updating	  premodern	  and	  reactionary	  
ideologies,	  but	  modernist	  and	  presumably	  forward-­‐looking	  ones.	  Also,	  unlike	  the	  radical	  Right,	  the	  
populist	  Left’s	  success	  may	  be	  more	  contagious	  to	  its	  mainstream	  cousins,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  centre-­‐
left.	  In	  other	  words,	  its	  conceptual	  outlook	  could	  prove	  more	  lasting	  in	  public	  discourse.	  Finally,	  the	  
populist	  Left’s	  organisational	  affiliation	  with	  transnational	  movements	  makes	  it	  both	  more	  flexible	  and	  
less	  menacing	  to	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  apolitical	  median	  voter.	  One	  could	  draw	  a	  parallel	  with	  the	  hasty	  years	  
of	  Cold	  War	  détente	  politics,	  when	  the	  mainstream	  Left	  was	  much	  more	  successful	  at	  driving	  its	  vision	  of	  
détente	  in	  alliance	  with	  rising	  new	  Left	  movements,	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  conservative	  and	  
Carolingian	  French	  and	  West	  German	  Gaullist	  vision.	  	  
The	  centre-­‐right	  needs	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  populist	  Left	  mindset	  in	  general.	  But	  foreign	  
policy	  is	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start.	  The	  centre-­‐right	  needs	  to	  invest	  more	  time	  in	  portraying	  the	  transatlantic	  
security	  structure,	  the	  values-­‐based	  EU	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  competent	  management	  of	  foreign	  policy	  
emergencies	  as	  a	  foundation	  and	  a	  needed	  complement	  of	  a	  diversified	  and	  pluralist	  society.	  To	  the	  
populism	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  and	  Russian	  oil,	  the	  centre-­‐right	  needs	  to	  respond	  with	  an	  engaged	  
discourse	  of	  responsibility,	  values	  and	  rights.	  Foreign	  policy	  disputes	  are	  rare,	  but	  if	  they	  exist,	  they	  tend	  
to	  become	  foundational,	  identity	  disputes.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  advances	  populist	  parties	  have	  made	  by	  
appropriating	  domestic	  themes	  of	  immigration	  or	  the	  economy,	  the	  centre-­‐right	  can	  regain	  the	  political	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